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Abstract
We introduce a two layer network model for social coordination incorporating two
relevant ingredients: a) different networks of interaction to learn and to obtain a pay-
off, and b) decision making processes based both on social and strategic motivations.
Two populations of agents are distributed in two layers with intralayer learning pro-
cesses and playing interlayer a coordination game. We find that the skepticism about
the wisdom of crowd and the local connectivity are the driving forces to accomplish
full coordination of the two populations, while polarized coordinated layers are only
possible for all-to-all interactions. Local interactions also allow for full coordination in
the socially efficient Pareto-dominant strategy in spite of being the riskier one.
1 Introduction
Several mechanisms and models have been implemented to explain the collective social
behavior that arises from the interactions among individuals. The own experience and the
experiences of others play an important role in determining the people choices in almost
all human interactions. Imitation has been a widespread mechanism of human decision-
making. Imitation of of common behavior reflects social influence in the individual, while
imitation by others of a successful individual is of strategic nature [1,2,3,4]. Strategic
interactions are often modeled by Game Theory. A relevant game theoretical model that
describes many real-life interactions in which the best course of action is to conform to
a consensus is the coordination game. The challenge of such model is how to coordinate
among its multiple Nash equilibria [5]. This issue has been addressed in several works
focusing on coordination games in a network framework [6,7,8,9]. However, two relevant
aspects of this context have been largely unexplored.
First, the study of a kind of interactions in which individuals distinguish according to
their roles between people with whom they play to obtain a payoff and those from whom
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they learn to update their strategies. An appropriate framework is needed to deal with
the possibility that people may identify the kind of interaction they have with their part-
ners. Such situations are very common and pertinent in real-life interactions. For example,
the interactions between and within firms and consumers, employers and employees, gov-
ernments and citizens, teachers and students, parents and children, medical doctors and
patients. There individuals interact across groups and receive a payoff for such interactions
(for instance parents with children) and look inside their group to learn and update their
strategies (for instance parents learn from other parents and children learn from other
children). What we have are the situations in which two populations are differentiated by
the role that their individuals perform. In simple models of social networks individuals
are unable to encompass different types of relationships. They play with and learn from
the same set of neighbors. A different class of networks that have layers in addition to
nodes and links, has been growing in popularity because of being a better description of a
real networked society. The study and analysis of multilayer networks is relatively recent
even though layered systems were examined decades ago in disciplines like sociology and
engineering [10,11,12], for a complete review see [13]. Here we propose a two-layer network
in which inside each layer, individuals update their strategies by a rule of learning and
across layers individuals receive an aggregate payoff by playing a coordination game. Most
previous studies of games in multilayer networks [14,15,16,17] consider playing the game
inside the layers while we consider game theory interactions across layers. In a recent work
[18] the authors consider a two-layer network wherein one network layer is used for the
accumulation of payoffs playing a social dilemma game and the other is used for strategy
updating. There, each agent is simultaneously located on both layers. In contrast, in our
two-layer network, each agent is located in just one layer. Therefore, there are two learning
networks, one in each layer, and a playing network across the two layers.
The second aspect refers to elucidate what happens when people make decisions heed-
ing simultaneously social and strategic motivations, [4]. In situations that call for accom-
plishing social efficiency and consensus two forces influence agent’s choices: the strategic
reasoning and the social pressure of the environment. In the sociological context, Gra-
novetter [19] proposed a model in which a certain amount of social pressure is necessary
for a person to adopt a new idea, product or technology. Opinion, innovation spreading
and social learning models have been dealing with this issue measuring the social pressure
as the number of contacts that have already adopted the newness, [19,20,21,22]. Here, we
consider that the influence of social pressure is related with the degree of doubts about
the strategies currently being played. Traditionally, the degree of doubts is measured as
the subjective belief about the consequences of a certain action, [23]. However, we assume
doubts as a social factor influencing choices in strategic environments. Then, the doubts of
an agent about how well she is playing depend on the popularity of her current strategy in
her learning network. Our approach of doubts is inspired by the work of [24]. They intro-
duce an evolutionary model of doubt-based selection dynamics. As well as [24], we assume
that the agents measure their doubts by observing the choices made by their fellow agents.
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Real-life interactions and laboratory experiments [25,26,27] provide clear evidence of the
importance of analyzing evolutionary dynamics based on social and strategic factors. For
instance, in [4,28] the authors explore the interplay between strategic and social imitative
behaviors in a coordination problem on a social network and in a networked Prisoners’
Dilemma respectively. In these works agents can evolve by a mixed dynamics of the voter
model [22,29] and the unconditional imitation. One of the main results in coordination
games on complex networks is that the interplay of social and strategic imitation drives
the system towards global consensus while neither social or strategic imitation alone does.
Our approach aims to deal with these two important aspects mentioned above and verify
the circumstances in which the complexity of such social and strategic behavior leads to
the consensus on the whole society.
The paper is organized as follows: in Sec. 2, we describe in detail our model of multilayer
network and propose an update rule based on social and strategic factors. In section 3 and
4 we show and analyze the numerical results for a pure and a general coordination game
respectively. Finally, Sec. 5 summarizes our main findings.
2 Model description
In this paper we consider a two-layer network in which each individual is connected to
two different social networks, the interlayer network or playing network, and the intralayer
network or learning network, see Figure 1.
2.1 Coordination games
In the playing network, each player interacts according to a coordination game with each of
her neighbors using the same action for all those games. A normal form representation of
this two-person, two-strategy coordination game is shown in Table 1. We focus our analysis
in two parametric settings, a pure or symmetric coordination game in which a = d = 1 and
b = 0 and a general or asymmetric coordination game in which a = 1, d = 2 and b > 0. The
profiles (L,L) and (R,R) are the two Nash equilibria in pure strategies in both settings.
Now, in the general coordination game the agents get a higher payoff by playing (R,R),
the Pareto (payoff) dominant equilibrium while for b > 1 they risk less by coordinating
on (L,L), called the risk dominant equilibrium. Games of this type are more interesting
than their fully symmetrical versions as it is added a confidence problem when the socially
efficient solution is also the riskier one.
2.2 Doubts and the parameter T
In the learning network, we propose an evolutionary update rule that heeds strategic think-
ing and the doubts that are generated by the popularity of the strategies. In order to
describe this aspect in detail we provide some definitions. As Cabrales and Uriarte [24], we
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Figure 1: Sketch of a multilayer network that we consider in this paper. The nodes
are connected to each other in a pairwise manner both inside of the layers and between
the layers for two populations A and B. Dotted lines describe the playing network (i.e.
interlayer edges) and the solid lines describe the learning network (intralayer edges). The
black nodes describe the agents playing strategy L and white nodes the agents playing
strategy R in a coordination game.
L
R
a, a 0,−b
−b, 0 d, d
L R
Table 1: Pay-off matrix for a general two-person, two-strategy coordination game
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assume that the doubts felt by an agent are related to the proportion of individuals with
whom they interact who are equally using the same strategy. Our approach differs from
[24] since while those authors assume that the agents are endowed with a doubt function,
we assume that they are endowed with a quantity T that calibrates their level of doubts
about the collective wisdom of crowd, T ∈ [0, 1]. This parameter T is in the same line of
the threshold value in [19]. Just as in [24], we may distinguish two broad types of popu-
lation, each corresponding to a doubtful behavior. A herding population, for T < 0.5, is
a population in which agents rely on the wisdom of crowd. As a consequence, they are
strongly influenced by the popularity of the current strategies of their partners. A skeptical
population, for T ≥ 0.5, is a population in which agents are very suspicious of the wisdom
of crowd: they are slightly influenced by the popularity of the current strategies of their
partners. In the updating process, each player i observes the proportion of agents, di, who
are playing the opposite strategy to hers in her learning neighborhood. Then, she measures
how popular her strategy is, comparing di with T . For instance, when di > T , player i has
doubts about the popularity of the strategy she is currently playing.
2.3 The degree of dissatisfaction
The evolution on time of the strategies derives from the levels of dissatisfaction felt by the
agents. The criterion that defines the level of satisfaction of an agent is based on two key
points: how well she is doing in terms of the payoff obtained in her playing network and how
popular her current strategy is in her learning network. Our approach of satisfaction is quite
different from [24] where they justify the choice of an index of dissatisfied agent via a model
of (correlated) similarities relations and from [9] that define a quantity called satisfaction
based on the strengths of the links. In our approach we distinguish four categories of agents
as described in Table 2, where pii is the aggregate payoff of agent i and ni is her degree in
the playing network.:
S P1 P2 U
playing network pii = βni pii = βni pii < βni pii < βni
learning network di < T di > T di < T di > T
Table 2: Degrees of satisfaction
The value of β is derived from the parametric setting of the class of coordination game
played. Since in the pairwise interaction of pure coordination games each player gets a
payoff of 1 by coordinating and 0 otherwise, then β = 1 for such game. The equality
pii = ni means that the player i coordinates with all her neighbors in the playing network:
then we say that agent i is strategically satisfied. In the case of a general coordination
game, β = 2 and an agent is strategically unsatisfied when she fails to coordinate with all
her neighbors on the socially efficient solution, i.e. the Pareto dominant strategy. This
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will happen when in a time step pii < 2ni. When di < T the proportion of neighbors in her
learning network who play the same strategy as she does is high enough so that player i feels
socially satisfied with her current strategy. Then, the level of satisfaction of an agent i is:
S (satisfied) when she is both socially (di < T ) and strategically (pii = βni) satisfied, is P1
or P2 (partially satisfied) when she is either socially (di > T ) or strategically (pii < βni)
unsatisfied and is U (unsatisfied) when she is both socially (di > T ) and strategically
(pii < βni) unsatisfied.
2.4 The strategic update rule
We propose a synchronous update rule in which each player can change her current strategy
according to her level of satisfaction. Namely,
1. If her level of satisfaction is S, she remains with the same strategy.
2. If her level of satisfaction is P1 or P2, she imitates the strategy of her best performing
neighbor in her learning network when such neighbor has received a larger payoff than
the player herself, otherwise she remains with the same strategy.
3. If her level of satisfaction is U, she changes her current strategy.
This rule might resemble the well-known unconditional imitation (UI) update rule intro-
duced in [30]. When agents follow the (UI) update rule, they seek to maximize their payoffs
imitating the most successful individuals. However, the first important difference in our
update rule is that individuals change their strategies conditional to their social or strate-
gic dissatisfaction. Some experimental results show evidence of the use of the (UI) rule by
individuals but also provide evidence that other social factors are influencing the updating
process [25,26,27]. Other important difference is the environment in which learning takes
place. Since individuals discriminate from whom they learn and with whom they play, this
update rule only takes place in the learning networks. The proposed update rule aims to
capture the individual behavior in a complex real life situation. Having setting out our
strategic and social framework, we now turn to describe the evolutionary dynamics. At
each elementary time step, each player plays the coordination game with each one of her
interlayer neighbors. Once the game is over and a payoff is assigned to each player, each
agent, observing her intralayer neighbor,s might change her strategy according to her level
of dissatisfaction. The process is repeated setting payoffs to zero.
2.5 Simulation settings
The size of the populations A and B during simulations is NA = NB = 1000. The numerical
results are obtained for random (Erdo¨s- Re´nyi, ER) networks and fully connected networks.
In the learning networks, kAA and kBB represent the mean degree (average number of links
per node) for population A and B respectively. In the playing network, the mean degree
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kAB corresponds to the average number of links per node across populations A and B.
The two strategies of the coordination games are L and R which are initially uniformly
randomly distributed with proportion 0.5.
3 Results for pure coordination games
As a benchmark, it is helpful to remind the final configuration of a structured population
playing a pure coordination game with the (UI) as update rule. The topology will define the
outcome of such population. For instance, for a complete network, referred also as a fully
connected network, in which each agent interact with every other agent, full coordination
is reached in one time step, while for a social network displaying local connectivity, such
as the random (ER) network, the system evolves to a non-coordinated frozen state. For
the study of our model we focus on these two network topologies. Our simulation results
show that the combination of strategic and social factors in a multilayer network drives
the system to quite different outcomes than those ones. Before displaying the results, we
need to clarify what a complete network means in our context of multilayer network. A
complete network here implies that every agent plays with every other agent in the playing
network and learns from every other agent in the learning network. Agents still discriminate
between with whom they play and from whom they learn. Moreover an absorbing state in
this framework is a state of intralayer coordination. In this state the agents are socially
satisfied since inside each layer the same strategy is spreading all over the network. A
state of interlayer coordination is a state of intralayer coordination in which the strategy
displayed in one layer coincides with the strategy reached in the other layer: agents are
socially and strategically satisfied. However, when the strategy in one layer is the opposite
to the one in the other layer, the social satisfaction of agents makes the strategies to remain
unchanged, and the configuration of a polarized two-layer network is an absorbing state of
the dynamics. In summary, a state of interlayer coordination implies a state of intralayer
coordination. but the reciprocal is not necessarily fulfilled. Both interlayer coordination
(or full coordination) and intralayer coordination are absorbing states of the dynamics.
The final configurations of the system can be described by the intra (inter) active
links defined as the number of links connecting agents with different choices in the playing
(learning) network. Figure 2 shows the average of the proportions of active links nA(T ),
inter layers between populations A and B and intra layer for each population, A and B, for
T ∈ [0.4, 1] in the fully connected network (left panel) and in the random (ER) network
(right panel). We find that for herding populations, T < 0.5, the final configuration of
the system is a state of non-coordination in both the learning network (intralayer) and
the playing network (interlayer) for the fully connected network and the random (ER)
network. Too much sensitivity to the social pressure plays against the intralayer, and
therefore, the interlayer coordination in any of these two network topologies. Such non-
coordination state is the one in which the proportions of the strategies in population A
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Figure 2: Average over 500 realizations of the densities of intralayer active links for each
population A and B and interlayer active links between A and B for each T ∈ [0.4, 1] with
NA = NB = 1000 in a fully connected network (left panel) and in a random (ER) network
with kAA = kBB = kAB = 10 (right panel).
and B fluctuate over 0.5, see the left panel of Figure 4. However, in the case of skeptical
populations, T ≥ 0.5, the system always reaches intralayer coordination both in the fully
connected and in the random (ER) networks. However, for interlayer coordinations, we
observe coordination on all realizations of the process in the case of random (ER) networks,
while interlayer coordination is only reached in half of the realizations in the fully connected
network. Figure 3 shows the number of realizations in which the system reaches a state of
interlayer coordination on the strategy L and R and a interlayer non-coordination state for
T ∈ [0.4, 1]. For T > 0.5, we observe that in the fully connected network (left panel), agents
fully coordinate either in L or R half of the realizations. The steady state of non interlayer
coordination is a completely polarized multilayer network in which all agents in population
A play the opposite strategy of all agents in B, see the right panel of Figure 4. In the case of
random (ER) networks (right panel of Fig.3) a state of interlayer coordination either in L or
R is always reached for T > 0.5. Comparison of this result with the one for fully connected
networks highlights the role of local interactions to reach consensus or full coordination:
While with all-to-all interactions (fully connected networks) interlayer coordination is only
reached in half of the realizations, the presence of local interactions (ER networks) leads
always to full (interlayer) coordination for skeptical populations (T > 0.5).
4 Results for general coordination games
To cover a better understanding of this multilayer model, we extend our analysis to a
general coordination game setup whose normal form representation is shown in Table 1
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Figure 3: Number of realizations, out of a total of 500 realization, that the populations
A and B reach coordination using strategy R (blue), using strategy L (green) and are not
able to coordinate (red) as function of T for a fully connected network(left panel) and
kAA = kBB = kAB = 10 (right panel).
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Figure 4: Time series of the proportion of agents playing L in A (blue) and L in B (red) in
a random (ER) network with kAA = kBB = kAB = 10 and T = 0.3 (left panel) and T = 0.8
(right panel).
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with a = 1, d = 2 and b > 0. Due to their social and strategic implications this class
of games has been studied analytically in an evolutionary framework [31,32] and by the
numerical simulations on several network topologies [6,7,8]. Previous numerical results
have shown that in a fully connected network, the agents using the (UI) update rule tend
to coordinate on (L,L), the risk dominant equilibrium whenever b > 1 and in the case of
a complex network, the (UI) update rule leads to frozen disordered configurations. In our
multilayer model with the dynamic update rule based on social and strategic implications,
our numerical results are again quite different from these previous results and also are
determined by the doubtful behavior of the populations. The same analysis made in
the last section for pure coordination games leads too to the same conclusion that states
of intralayer coordination are absorbing states of the dynamics. The state of interlayer
coordination is another absorbing state that implies intralayer coordination.
As already seen in the previous section of pure coordination game, also in the general
coordination game the herding populations are not able to reach intralayer coordination
neither for fully connected nor for random (ER) networks. The sensitivity to the social
pressure is again a detrimental factor in any of the two network topologies. Similarly, for
skeptical populations, the final configuration of intralayer coordination is always reached
and depending on the network topology the state of interlayer coordination is also accom-
plished. As an example, Figure 5 shows the densities of intralayer and interlayer active
links for a general coordination game with b = 1.1. For T > 0.5, the system reaches in-
terlayer coordination almost 70% of the realizations in the fully connected network ( left
panel of Figure 5). This proportion is higher than the 50% observed in the case of the pure
coordination games. In the random (ER) network, the final configuration of the system is
always of interlayer coordination, see right panel of Figure 5.
The main point at issue here is whether Pareto-dominant equilibrium can be coor-
dinated by the agents. In the game theoretical approach, the coordination on the risk-
dominant equilibrium (L,L) is unavoidable whenever b > 1. In our framework, skeptical
individuals are those able to reach intralayer or interlayer coordination, however the key
point is to find out whether such coordination favors the desirable socially efficient out-
come, that is the (R,R) Pareto dominant coordination. First, let us analyze what happens
in the complete multilayer network. As the initial strategies are uniformly randomly dis-
tributed with proportion 0.5, almost all individuals are at least strategically unsatisfied
and willing to change their strategies. According to the update rule, an unsatisfied agent
who is playing L in a fully connected network will change her strategy to R only when
b < 2
pL
− 3 where pL is the proportion of agents playing L in her learning network. Due
to the initial conditions pL ≈ 0.5 the parameter b must be approximately lesser than 1
to make agents who are playing L change to R. Panel (a) of Figure 6 shows, for a fully
connected network, the number of realizations that the system reaches interlayer coordi-
nation on L, on R, and intra but not interlayer coordination as function of b. We observe
that as b increases, the number of realizations reaching interlayer coordination on L in-
creases. As a consequence, the rate of coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium
10
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
T
n
A(T
)
 
 
Intra A and B
Inter AB
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
T
n
A(T
)
 
 
 Intra A and B
 Inter AB
Figure 5: For a general coordination game with b = 1.1, average over 500 realizations of the
densities of intralayer active links for each population A and B and interlayer active links
between A and B for T ∈ [0.4, 1] in a fully connected network (left panel) and a random
(ER) network with kAA = kBB = kAB = 10 (right panel).
(R,R) decreases with b, with the most likely coordination shifting from Pareto dominance
to risk dominance around b∗ = 1, as expected. Noteworthy that the range of values of
b in which the state of polarized layers can be reached is also around b = 1, where the
two Nash equilibria have the same expected payoff. In panels (b) and (c) of Figure 6 for
ER networks, we show that such threshold b∗ in which the chance of coordination on R
starts to decrease is higher the lower the average number of links per node is. The effect of
locality not only favors interlayer coordination over only intralayer coordination (polarized
layers) but also favors Pareto dominant coordination. In our numerical simulations (not
shown) we find that already for kAA = kBB = kAB = 10 the agents manage to coordinate
on the Pareto dominant equilibrium (R,R) for any value of b ∈ [0.5, 2], overcoming the
frozen disordered configurations reported in previous works. The strong effect of locality
is due to the possibility that pR > T for an agent who is playing L. In such case she
will be totally unsatisfied and will switch her strategy to R. In our multilayer model, the
locality for skeptical populations is the driving force that favors interlayer coordination on
the socially efficient outcome, that is the Pareto dominant strategy.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a multilayer network model in which agents of two pop-
ulations play and learn in two disaggregated networks and update their strategies heeding
social and strategic motivations. A network between the two populations is for playing ac-
cording to a coordination game. There each agent receives an aggregate payoff as a result
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Figure 6: Number of realizations reaching interlayer coordination on L (blue), on R (green)
and polarized networks state with only intralayer coordination (red) as function of b for
500 realizations for skeptical populations with T = 0.7, in a fully connected network (a),
a random (ER) network with kAA = kBB = kAB = 500 (b), and kAA = kBB = kAB = 100
(c).
of her interaction with each of her playing neighbors. The other network is for learning in
which each agent can update her game strategy motivated by a feeling of social or strategic
dissatisfaction. When an agent is unsatisfied either socially or strategically, she can update
her strategy imitating the strategy of the most successful neighbor. The agent searches
for such neighbor looking inside her own population. We have shown that the degree of
social pressure calibrated by the level of doubts plays an important role in the networks
topologies considered. The skepticism about the wisdom of crowd and the locality of in-
teractions are the driving forces for collaboration and social efficiency in both pure and
general coordination games.
For pure coordination games in a skeptical environment, each population evolves to-
wards a coordinated state in both fully connected and random (ER) networks. However,
in fully connected networks (non-local interactions) the populations eventually may coor-
dinate each other in the opposite strategy leading to a polarized multilayer network. In
the case of general coordination games the challenge is to elucidate whether the Pareto-
dominant strategy, the socially efficient outcome, can be established in the populations.
Previous results in well-mixed and structured populations tend to favor the risk-dominant
equilibrium in the parametric setting in which the Pareto dominant equilibrium is also
the riskier one. In contrast, our simulation results show that the skepticism and the local
12
connectivity allow the populations to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium even
in the riskier setting.
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